



Model-Based Engineering for Cybersecurity:
Preparing for UN ECE Regulation and ISO/SAE-21434

July 1st 2020 | EUROPE

MathWorks
**AUTOMOTIVE
CONFERENCE 2020**



In the News 5 years ago...



HACKERS REMOTELY KILL A JEEP ON THE HIGHWAY—WITH ME IN IT



Miller (left) and Valasek demonstrated the rest of their attacks on the Jeep while I drove it around an empty parking lot.  WHITNEY CURTIS FOR WIRED

Source: <https://www.wired.com/2016/08/jeep-hackers-return-high-speed-steering-acceleration-hacks/>

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


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Source: <https://www.wired.com/2016/08/jeep-hackers-return-high-speed-steering-acceleration-hacks/>

Cybersecurity – Emerging Topic

On-Board & V2X Communication




- Growing communication of on-board systems, sensors and external sites
- Car becomes another node of IoT
- Security can compromise vehicle safety

„FCA recalls 1.4 Million cars after Jeep hack“




<http://www.blogcdn.com/www.autoblog.com/media/2013/02/2014-jeep-cherokee-1.jpg>

www



Current milestones around regulations, guidelines and standards



11/2019
**ENISA publishes
 "GOOD
 PRACTICES FOR
 SECURITY OF
 SMART CARS"**

02/2020
**ISO/SAE 21434 DIS
 is published**

06/2020
**UN ECE WP.29
 discussing adoption**

12/2020
**ISO/SAE 21434
 FDIS to be
 published**








Figure 1 - ISO/SAE 21434 Overview




Why is this important?



- UN ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2020/79 regulation proposal on Cybersecurity
 - Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to cyber security and of their cybersecurity management systems (CSMS)
 - Relevant for homologation
 - Automotive supply-chain to implement the UN Regulation
- ISO/SAE 21434 – “Road vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering”
 - Widely seen as reference implementation of a CSMS for E/E Systems
 - Development processes need to be adapted to deal with Cybersecurity Threats and Risks




ISO/SAE 21434 is aligned with the V model and ISO 26262



CS



Embedded Systems Threats and Vulnerabilities



HSM: Hardware Security Module

Databases collecting security vulnerabilities and exploits



- CVE – Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (cve.mitre.org)
- OSVDB – Open Source Vulnerability Database (osvdb.org)
- SANS Institute - SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security (www.sans.org)
- OWASP - Open Web Application Security Project (www.owasp.org)

Rank	Score	ID	Name
[1]	93.8	CWE-89	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
[2]	83.3	CWE-78	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
[3]	79.0	CWE-120	Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
[4]	77.7	CWE-79	Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
[5]	76.9	CWE-306	Missing Authentication for Critical Function
[6]	76.8	CWE-862	Missing Authorization
[7]	75.0	CWE-798	Use of Hard-coded Credentials
[8]	75.0	CWE-311	Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
[9]	74.0	CWE-434	Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
[10]	73.8	CWE-807	Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
[11]	73.1	CWE-250	Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

CERT and other organizations share secure coding practices



source: <https://www.securecoding.cert.org>

CERT Secure Coding

Seiten

BEREICHsverknüpfungen

- Dashboard
- Home
- Android
- C
- C++
- Java
- Perl

Top 10 Secure Coding Practices

Erstellt von Robert Seacord, zuletzt geändert von Robert Seacord (Manager) am Mär 01, 2011

Top 10 Secure Coding Practices

Validate inputs Validate input from all untrusted data sources. Proper input validation can eliminate the vast majority of software **vulnerabilities**. Be suspicious of most external data sources, including command line arguments, network interfaces, environmental variables, and user controlled

Heed compiler warnings and use static and dynamic analysis tools

available for your compiler and eliminate warnings by modifying the code [C **MSC00-A**, C++ **MSC00-A**]. Use static and dynamic analysis tools to detect

Architect/Design Software for security policies

software architecture and design your software to implement and enforce security policies. For




Jeep Hack: Deterministic Random Number Generator

Vulnerability of the in-car Wi-Fi



```

Source
wifi.c x
18     }
19     return v3;
20 }
21
22 char *get_password()
23 {
24     int c_max = 12;
25     int c_min = 8;
26     unsigned int t = time((void *)0);
27     srand (t);
28     unsigned int len = (rand() % (c_max - c_min + 1)) + c_min;
29     char *password = malloc(len);
30
31
32     unsigned int v10 = rand();
33     int v11 = convert_byte_to_ascii_letter(v10 % 62);
34     password[v9] = v11;
35     v9++;
    
```




Defect: ID 2: 'rand' is a cryptographically weak PRNG.
To make your program more secure, use 'CryptGenRandom' (Windows) or 'RAND_bytes' (OpenSSL) instead.



Source: <http://illmatics.com/Remote%20Car%20Hacking.pdf>

Miller (left) and Valasek demonstrated the rest of their attacks on the Jeep while I drove it around an empty parking lot. © WHITNEY CURTIS FOR WIRED

Model-Based Design - examples of potential Cert C issues *



- **FLP30-C**

- Do not use floating-point variables as loop counters

2

- **FLP34-C**

- Ensure that floating-point conversions are within range of the new type

41

- **INT30-C**

- Ensure that unsigned integer operations do not wrap

72

- **INT31-C**


- Ensure that integer conversions do not result in lost or misinterpreted data

343

*) all user made; found in C code generated from 50 industry models

Model-Based Design - examples of potential Cert C issues *

The models have not been designed to comply with Cert C
(violations are specifically relevant if taint data is involved)



- **FLP30-C**

- Do not use floating-point variables as loop counters

2

- **FLP34-C**

- Ensure that floating-point conversions are within range of the new type

41

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
- **INT31-C**

- Ensure that integer conversions do not result in lost or misinterpreted data

343

*) all user made; found in C code generated from 50 industry models

Early security considerations at model level




- Identify ...
 - Discouraged blocks
 - Non-determinism
 - Basic design flaws

- Covers:
 - Most frequent issues (according the inhouse study)
 - CERT C, CWE and other checks


- Result:
 - Analyzable model
 - Removed basic flaws

The screenshot shows the Model Advisor interface for the project 'focVelocityEncoder_F28069'. In the left-hand tree view, the check '^Check for bitwise operations on signed integers' is selected and highlighted with a red box. A red arrow points from this check to the right-hand pane, which displays a warning: 'Warning: The following bitwise operations on signed integers were found:'. Below the warning, a table lists the location as '.../Bit to Integer Converter'. A 'Recommended Action' is provided: 'Change data type to unsigned integer.' Another red arrow points from the warning pane to the Simulink block diagram at the bottom, where a 'Bit to Integer Converter' block is highlighted with a red box and labeled 'Design flaw!'.

Quantifying Security Compliance at Code Level




Code from original example model:




~50% fewer Cert-C violations!

Code from improved example model:



Design improvements reduce late findings in C code and design iterations!

Documenting formal cybersecurity requirements




- Outcome of Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) needs to be documented and linked to a system or a component
- Each threat can be mitigated by one or more requirements

The screenshot shows the Requirements Editor application window. The main area displays a tree view of requirements under 'motorControlRequirements'. A red box highlights a sub-tree starting with requirement #4, 'Cybersecurity', which includes several sub-requirements (4.1-4.6) related to resilience against various attacks. The right-hand pane shows the 'Properties' for the selected requirement, including its type (Functional), index (4), custom ID (#9), and summary (Cybersecurity). The description field contains the text: 'The system has to be resilient to cyberattacks.'

Index	ID	Summary	Implemented	Verified
1	#1	Setting time Requirement		
2	#2	State Machine Requirements		
2.1	#3	Open Loop Reachability		
2.2	#4	Standby after Error		
2.3	#5	Closed Loop activation		
2.4	#6	Encoder calibration		
3	#8	Transducer voltages requirement		
4	#9	Cybersecurity		
4.1	#10	Resilience to fuzzy attacks		
4.2	#12	Resilience to downsampling attacks		
4.3	#13	Resilience to interruption attacks		
4.4	#14	Resilience to overflow attacks		
4.5	#15	Resilience to man-in-the-middle attacks		
4.6	#16	Resilience to replay attacks		

Author and manage functional/cybersecurity requirements



Create, organize and view requirements directly in your models

Track implementation and verification status

The screenshot shows the Simulink Requirements Editor interface. The main workspace displays a Simulink model titled "Field-Oriented Control Velocity Control With Encoder Position". The model includes various blocks like "Motor_On", "CommandTypeEvs", "ADC_Transducer_Voltage", "Encoder_Index", and "Controller_Modes". A requirements table is visible at the bottom of the editor, listing requirements with their indices, IDs, and summaries.

Index	ID	Summary
3	#8	Transducer voltages requirement
4	#9	Cybersecurity
4.1	#10	Resilience to fuzzy attacks
4.2	#12	Resilience to downsampling attacks
4.3	#13	Resilience to interruption attacks
4.4	#14	Resilience to overflow attacks

The screenshot shows the Requirements Editor window with a detailed view of requirement #10. The window includes a menu bar (File, Edit, Display, Analysis, Report, Help) and a toolbar. The main area displays a table of requirements, with #10 selected. The Properties panel on the right shows details for requirement #10, including its type, index, custom ID, and a description/rationale.

Index	ID	Summary	Implemented	Verified
1	#1	Setting time Requirement	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	#2	State Machine Requirements	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.1	#3	Open Loop Reachability	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.2	#4	Standby after Error	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.3	#5	Closed Loop activation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.4	#6	Encoder calibration	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	#8	Transducer voltages requirement	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	#9	Cybersecurity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.1	#10	Resilience to fuzzy attacks	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.2	#12	Resilience to downsampling attacks	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.3	#13	Resilience to interruption attacks	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.4	#14	Resilience to overflow attacks	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.5	#15	Resilience to man-in-the-middle attacks	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.6	#16	Resilience to replay attacks	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Properties

Type: Functional
 Index: 4.1
 Custom ID: #10
 Summary: Resilience to fuzzy attacks

Description **Rationale**

The system has to be resilient to fuzzy attacks and continue normal operation with minimal disturbance.


Links

Implemented by: [focVelocityEncoder.15](#)

Cybersecurity testing in simulation using attack libraries



- Run attacks in simulation
 - Attacks can be implemented in Simulink
 - Usable for every system model and to attack almost every signal
 - Helps improve effectiveness of intrusion detection systems (IDS)
- Adaptable
 - Increase variety of cyberattacks and use masked parameters for flexibility
 - MATLAB Function blocks for more complex logic
 - Testing in SIL, PIL, HIL



Source: <https://www.mathworks.com/videos/a-reinforcement-learning-framework-for-smart-secure-and-efficient-cyber-physical-autonomy-1550746639241.html>

Model-Based Engineering use cases for ISO/SAE 21434




Risk management
(e.g. TARA/HARA)

System Requirements

System Release

Continuous System Care

Threat modeling & analysis




System Design

System Integration and Test

Intrusion detection & prevention

Intrusion
Detection
Reaction


Secure modeling & design



SW Design

SW Test

Smart fuzz testing




Secure code generation

- MISRA C
- CERT C
- CWE

SW Implementation

Code level security verification



- Filter by Source**
- Community 80
- Filter by Category**
- < Clear Categories
 - < Data Import and Analysis
 - Data Import and Export 1,101
 - Large Files and Big Data 76
 - Preprocessing Data 33
 - Descriptive Statistics 63
 - Visual Exploration 173
 - Encryption / Cryptography 80**
- Filter by Type**
- Toolboxes 3
 - Apps 1
 - Functions 75
- Filter by Product Family**
- MATLAB 73

80 RESULTS

Encryption / Cryptography (80)





Image Encryption

This GUI does the Image Encryption of any RGB, Gray image of different formats.


65 Downloads i ★★★★★



Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-256

Advance Encryption Standard-256 encryption and decryption using 256-bit hexadecimal key and 128-bit


64 Downloads i ★★★★★



Matlab AES Encryption Decryption Example

Advanced Encryption Standard helper class.

48 Downloads i ★★★★★



RSA algorithm

RSA algorithm for encrypting and decrypting a message


48 Downloads i ★★★★★



RSA Public Key Encryption and Signing (32bit)

Basic RSA Public Key encryption and signing to demonstrate the principle.


45 Downloads i ★★★★★



Implementation of RSA Algorithm

RSA is an algorithm for public-key cryptography.


42 Downloads i ★★★★★



Data Encryption Standard (DES)

The last generation of encryption standard, good for cryptography study and cipher design.


36 Downloads i ★★★★★



Steganography using LSB substitution

The term steganography means "cover writing"


30 Downloads i ★★★★★



Picture Encryption and Decryption

This algorithm decrypts and encrypts images based on keys


30 Downloads i ★★★★★



Caesar Cipher Encryption and Decryption with MATLAB gui guide

Using MATLAB guide this program will encrypt and decrypt letters using caesar cipher


24 Downloads i ★★★★★



Fingerprint Color Image Database .v1

Authors: Dr. Ujwala Gawande, Kamal Hajari and Yogesh Golhar

22 Downloads i ★★★★★



Caesar Cipher

This is Program for Caesar Cipher encryption Technique.

19 Downloads i ★★★★★
















In 2018 41% of the automotive suppliers did not have an established cybersecurity program or team

Source: Ponemon Study of Automotive Industry Cybersecurity Practices (2018)

Q&A

Are you planning to implement Cybersecurity requirements in the near future?

- YES, we're already working on it
- YES, this will be relevant for us in the next 1-2 years
- NO, this is not relevant for us

Please contact us with questions



sdavid@MathWorks.com

